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Abstract Nicholas Agar has recently argued that it would
be irrational for future human beings to choose to radically
enhance themselves by uploading their minds onto com-
puters. Utilizing Searle’s argument that machines cannot
think, he claims that uploading might entail death. He
grants that Searle’s argument is controversial, but he
claims, so long as there is a non-zero probability that
uploading entails death, uploading is irrational. I argue that
Agar’s argument, like Pascal’s wager on which it is mod-
elled, fails, because the principle that we (or future agents)
ought to avoid actions that might entail death is not action
guiding. Too many actions fall under its scope for the
principle to be plausible. I also argue that the probability
that uploading entails death is likely to be lower than Agar
recognizes.
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1 Introduction
In his important new book Humanity’s End (Agar 2010),
Nicholas Agar presents a number of different arguments for
the conclusion that we ought to reject radical enhancement
of ourselves. In this paper, I will focus on just one of these
arguments. The argument, Searle’s wager, is designed to
show that it would be irrational to follow Ray Kurzweil’s
(2005) advice and attempt to upload ourselves onto com-
puters; if it is successful, it generalizes to any attempt to
replace the organic supervenience base of our conscious-
ness with a non-biological substrate. I have no particular
opinion one way or another concerning whether we should
embrace radical enhancement, by these means or by any
other. My purpose is to focus on this argument alone. I
shall show that, like Pascal’s wager, on which it is mod-
elled, Searle’s wager fails to be action-guiding. Agar’s
basic strategy is to argue that so long as there is a non-zero
possibility that uploading might entail death, it would be
irrational to choose uploading. But the doubts to which he
appeals cannot be restricted to the choice of uploading or
not. Instead, they extend to such a wide class of actions—
and omissions—that the strategy cannot be used to argue
for any particular action at all.
2 Searle’s wager
Agar’s aim in arguing against Kurzweil is to establish that
it would be irrational ‘to accept offers to replace the parts
of our brains responsible for thought processes that we
consider essential to our conscious experiences, even if the
replacements manifestly outperform neurons’ (Agar 2010:
65). His claim is that the risks of enhancement are expo-
nentially greater than the benefits, no matter how great the
benefits are. Agar’s argument is explicitly modelled on
Pascal’s wager. Just as Pascal’s wager—allegedly—estab-
lishes the prudential irrationality of atheism, so Searle’s
wager aims to establish the prudential irrationality of
uploading your mind onto a computer.
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It might be helpful to model both wagers in the form of
pay-off matrices. Let us begin with Pascal’s wager:
Pascal’s Wager: pay-off matrix
Believe Disbelieve
God exists Eternal bliss Eternal torment
God does not exist Small utility loss Small utility gain
The important cell for Pascal is the top right-hand one:
by failing to believe, we risk damnation. Since the worst we
can do by believing is forgo a small gain of utility (by
wasting our time on religious activities; bottom left cell),
we ought to believe. The wager is powerful because it
prescinds from the probabilities. We do not need to calcu-
late the likelihood that God exists to calculate that we ought
to believe because no matter what the probability of God’s
existing, eternal torment has a disutility that outweighs the
utility gains from failing to believe in a non-existent God:
any finite probability multiplied by infinity is infinite.
Searle’s wager is so named because Agar builds it on
Searle’s Chinese room argument (Searle 1980, 1990). The
Chinese room argument is supposed to establish that
nothing could think unless symbols were intrinsically
meaningful for it. Searle claims that because symbols can
never be intrinsically meaningful for a merely syntactical
device, computers can never think. That is, it is impossible
to derive semantics from syntax.
The Chinese room argument is controversial. But Agar
need not claim that the argument is certainly correct or
even that it is very likely to be correct. Instead, just as
Pascal’s wager succeeds (if it succeeds) so long as there
some non-zero probability that God exists, so (Agar
claims) Searle’s wager succeeds if there is some non-zero
probability that Searle is correct. The Chinese room argu-
ment has come in for some heavy criticism, but there is
surely some non-zero probability that it (or a suitably
amended successor) is correct. Assuming this is the case,
Searle’s wager generates the following pay-off matrix for
uploading ourselves into computers:
Searle’s Wager: pay-off matrix










The pay-off matrix is generated by considering our
options and their possible consequences. Either we upload
ourselves into computers or we do not. If we do not, then at
worst we forgo the benefits of radical enhancement (top left
cell): if we had uploaded ourselves and our consciousness
survived the procedure, we would have benefited signifi-
cantly (top right cell). If consciousness would not have
survived, then we have had a lucky escape (bottom left
cell): we continue in existence, avoiding the death that
would have been our fate otherwise (bottom right cell). The
important cell, for Agar, is the bottom right cell. By
uploading ourselves, we risk death. But the very worst
outcome of failing to upload is much less bad: it consists
only in forgoing the benefits of radical enhancement.
There is one obvious disanalogy between Pascal’s wager
and Searle’s wager. The worst outcome on Searle’s wager
is death. Now, while death is, I suppose, bad, it is not that
bad. As a matter of fact, many people whom we regard as
rational judge that there are goods in life worth risking
death in order to attain. Some of these goods are extremely
weighty (‘give me liberty or give me death’) but some are
relatively trivial. Think of the goods pursued through risky
activities—skiing, hiking, and so on. Many people think
that it is worth the relatively small, but real, chance of
dying in the pursuit of these goods. Even those who do not
think these goods worth the risks involved, nevertheless
routinely take some risks because doing so improves the
quality of their lives. They cross streets, they go into
crowded places despite the risks of infection, and so on. No
one thinks that death is so bad that it is worth deferring at
any cost. For Searle’s wager to succeed, however, the
disutility of death needs to be very bad. Recall, the argu-
ment is supposed to prescind from probabilities. If the
worst outcome of uploading is not all that bad, then it does
not prescind from probabilities because unlike eternal
damnation, we cannot be assured that multiplying the
badness of the outcome by its probability will always yield
an enormous expected disutility. If death is not all that bad,
the argument entails only that we ought to decide whether
to upload by attempting to calculate the likelihood of the
worst outcome, as well as the benefits of the best outcome.
Agar is well aware of this disanalogy between Searle’s
wager and Pascal’s. Given how things stand right now, he
concedes, it might be rational to choose uploading. The
disutility of death will probably be reasonably high for
most of us, but it might be more than offset by the potential
gains of uploading. If you are convinced by one of the
many different replies to the Chinese room argument that
have been put forward over the years, you might calculate
that this is a gamble worth taking. But as Agar points out,
none of us face the choice of uploading right now. He
argues that for those people who might actually face the
choice, uploading will be highly irrational, because for
them the expected disutility of death will be significantly
higher than for us and the utility of uploading rather lower.
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The disutility of death will be greater because by the time
uploading is an option, human beings will be ‘experiencing
many of the benefits of the genetic revolution’ (Agar 2010:
74). We might have already reached ‘longevity escape
velocity’, which is to say that our expected lifespan will be
increasing at a rate faster than one year per year. We might
have beaten cancer, heart disease and infection. We will
also already be greatly cognitively enhanced, by genetics
and by neurophysiological prostheses. Of course, Agar
concedes this is all rather speculative. It is certainly pos-
sible that we might develop the means of uploading with-
out also developing the genetic, medical and technological
enhancements that he envisages. But, he argues, we need
not be convinced that these enhancements or imminent or
even possible. His argument depends only on the ‘likeli-
hood of their being achieved relative to the achievability of
uploading’ (Agar 2010: 75). Uploading requires develop-
ments in computer science and in neuroscience that seem
significantly harder to achieve than the medical and genetic
breakthroughs needed for alternative enhancement mech-
anisms to be available.
If this is correct, then for those people facing the choice of
uploading themselves, the disutility of death will likely be
very much greater than for us. Given the radical extension of
healthspan that enhancements will have brought and the
high quality of life with enhanced intelligence, aesthetic
sensibilities and what have you, the loss someone would risk
by uploading will be much greater than the loss we would
risk by making the same choice. Moreover, Agar argues that
the benefits of uploading would also be very much smaller
for these people than they would be for us. Agar concedes
that the benefits might be large; ‘the enhancements com-
patible with the brain’s survival are likely to be significantly
more modest than those enabled by uploading’ (Agar 2010:
76). Nevertheless, he argues that it would not be rational for
the already greatly enhanced to trade in their currently
enhanced state for a chance of this much more enhanced
state. He points out that there is a diminishing return from
some kinds of goods. Because of this diminishing return, it
might make sense to refuse to trade a high probability of a
smaller gain for a smaller probability of a large gain. Agar
expresses this point in terms of refusing to trade a smaller
gain for a larger with expected utility held constant, but the
point can be strengthened: even if the expected utility of
the larger reward is higher than the expected utility of the
smaller, it might be rational to refuse to trade. I would prefer
a 100% chance of $1,000,000 to a 1% chance at
$150,000,000, and I do not think my preference is irrational.
Agar argues that the subjective value, for the person facing
the choice of uploading, is likely to be significantly smaller
than its objective magnitude.
Why should this be true? After all, cognitive enhance-
ment does not involve a good like money, which might
diminish in value because it is a positional good.
Enhancements might be intrinsically valuable and therefore
not subject to diminishing marginal returns or subject to
diminishment at a much slower rate. Agar claims that,
nevertheless, it is likely that people will not desire the more
radical enhancements all that strongly. This is because ‘we
have comparatively few desires that correspond specifi-
cally’ with the goods such enhancements might make
available (Agar 2010: 77). In our unenhanced state, we
cannot even fully understand the desires we would have
were we radically enhanced. We have to make our choice
from here, where there is an enormous gap between what
we can really grasp and the goods that radical enhancement
might make available to us. Agar notes that for a billion-
aire, the preference for a 100% chance of a further
$1,000,000 rather than a 1% chance at $100,000,000 might
be irrational, because the billionaire has desires that can be
satisfied only with the larger sum. But the fact that we
know that there is a standpoint from which our preferences
would reverse is irrelevant to what it is rational to prefer
from our current perspective. Our current desires and goals
are ‘contingent on our current levels of cognitive powers’
(Agar 2010: 70). We want to protect and promote our
current relationships and our current moral and political
ideals. Were we radically enhanced, we might no longer
have these desires, so choosing radical enhancement would
be making a choice which would not promote what is most
important to us right now.
3 Assessing Searle’s wager
I turn now to assessing Agar’s argument against radical
enhancement. I shall argue that there are a number of
considerations that suggest that Agar’s confidence in the
strength of the central contention—that uploading entails
death—is misplaced. The likelihood that uploading entails
death is more remote than he thinks, because it is not just
one controversial philosophical issue—the success of the
Chinese room argument—that has to be resolved in his
favour for uploading to entail death. Instead, a whole host
of philosophical issues has to come down in his favour: the
right account of personal identity and its cessation must be
true, and the right account of the badness of death must be
true, and so on. I concede, however, that there is a non-zero
chance that all these issues might come down in the way
Agar requires. Nevertheless, I will argue that Agar is
wrong in thinking that any positive probability of upload-
ing entailing death is sufficient to show that uploading is
irrational and that therefore the fact that the probability is
lower than he recognizes is directly relevant to the
assessment of the rationality of uploading. My strategy for
showing that a non-zero probability of entailing death
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cannot suffice to show that uploading is irrational will
consist in showing that far too many actions, and for that
matter, omissions have a non-zero probability of entailing
death and that as a consequence the principle to which
Agar appeals cannot be action guiding.
In making his case for the irrationality of choosing
uploading, Agar oscillates between two different perspec-
tives: the perspective of those who face the choice of
uploading sometime in the future (at t1), and our current
perspective (at t). In arguing that the disutility of death, for
the purposes of Searle’s wager, is very high, Agar argues
that we ought to adopt the perspective of the highly
enhanced. For them (though not for us), it would be irra-
tional to run the risks of uploading, because for them
(though not for us) death has been defeated or at any rate
very greatly deferred (as have the infirmities of the flesh).
But in arguing that the benefits of uploading would be
small, he adopts our current perspective. It would be irra-
tional for us (though not for them) to choose to upload
ourselves because we (though not them) have few desires
that uploading would satisfy. Now, this is not a straight out
inconsistency, since the perspectives affect different cells
of Searle’s wager (top right and bottom right, respectively).
However, it does entail that the task of showing that
uploading is rational is easier than Agar seems to think.
When we consider the problem holding our temporal per-
spective fixed, either the disutility of death is great or the
utility of uploading is relatively small, but never both at
once. Hence closing the gap—demonstrating that the
expected benefits of uploading outweigh the risks—will be
easier than Agar thinks. Those who have the most to lose
also have the most to gain, and those with the least to gain
also have the least to lose.
It seems to follow at once that Searle’s wager is not
analogous to Pascal’s. There is no temporal perspective
from which the gap between expected benefit and expected
cost is so great that the probabilities cannot matter. In other
words, in deciding how to act, we have two different pay-
off matrixes to consider. Let us, therefore, address the two
temporal perspectives independently.
4 Our current choice
As Agar notes, right now, we do not face the choice of
uploading or not. But we do face a choice: how are we to
invest our scarce resources? Right now, the costs of death
are not so great that uploading is obviously irrational for
us, but Agar argues, since the benefits of uploading are
relatively small right now, it is rational for us to invest our
resources in other ways. Because we have few desires now
that would be satisfied by radical enhancement, we do
better to invest in less radical means of enhancing
ourselves. As a way of avoiding assessing the probabilities,
I think this argument fails. Notice that we commonly
believe that it can be rational to invest in future goods, even
when we fail to desire those future goods at the time of the
investment. It is sufficient that we believe that there is a
high (enough) probability that we will come to desire those
goods. Thus, for instance, we believe that it is rational to
spend time and effort to acquire skills in order to compete
in the job market, even though we might lack the desire to
compete in the job market at the time of the investment.
Children are often forced by their parents to spend time
doing things they have no desire to do and which will
enable them to do other things which, again, they have no
current desire to do, and most of us think that these actions
are permissible and quite likely even obligatory. The fact
that the children can be expected to become adults who
would then regret their wasted opportunities suffices to
rationalize the choices made on their behalf.
If, therefore, there is a reasonable probability that we will
become people with desires which can be satisfied only by
uploading, then it is an open question whether we ought to
direct a proportion of our research dollars into uploading
research. Pace Agar, whether we should or should not do so
ought to be assessed on the balance of probabilities. We
need to know (a) how likely it is that we will become agents
with desires that can only be satisfied by uploading; (b) how
likely it is we will survive uploading; (c) what we forgo by
investing in uploading rather than alternatives; and (d) is it
really the case that we now have few or no desires that
would be satisfied by radical uploading?
Because settling the question whether we ought now to
invest in research that might lead to uploading in the future
requires assigning a probability to (b) the questions we ask
ourselves now are not independent of the questions that
future agents will confront (though not vice versa, if future
agents confront the question whether to upload or not, the
question how we ought to act now will be irrelevant to their
considerations). In claiming that there are two questions we
need to ask, I am not claiming that the questions are not
related to one another; my claim, rather, is that there are
some considerations that are relevant to only one of the
options and not the other and that Agar illegitimately mixes
together these considerations. The fact, if it is a fact, that we
now have few desires that can be satisfied by uploading does
not entail that it is highly improbable that we ought to invest
in uploading. Depending on the answers to questions (a) to
(d), it might be rational to invest in uploading research.
5 The choice facing the already highly enhanced
Agar believes that independently of the question of what
we ought to do now, the options facing the already
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enhanced are sufficiently similar to those figuring in Pas-
cal’s wager to rule out the possibility that it might be
rational to choose uploading. Though he concedes that it is
an open question whether the Chinese room argument
succeeds, a vanishingly small probability of Searle being
right is sufficient to establish the irrationality of uploading.
That is, the costs of uploading if Searle is right are so high
that even a tiny probability of his being right is sufficient to
establish the irrationality of uploading: ‘if there is room for
rational disagreement you should not treat the probability
of Searle being correct as zero…This is all that the Wager
requires’ (Agar 2010: 71). There are many replies to the
Chinese room argument extant (the virtual minds reply, the
systems reply, the robot reply, and more; see Cole 2009 for
review); many people, including me, find one or more of
these replies persuasive. But given that there is a non-zero
chance that Searle might be right (or that some other
argument for the same conclusion might be right), it would
be irrational to upload because the costs would be so high.
Before assessing the choice facing the already highly
enhanced, I will set out some complications that Agar does
not recognize. These issues complicate matters, but do not
fundamentally alter the choice facing the enhanced. How-
ever, as we will see, these complications make our task
much easier if (as I shall go on to argue) Agar’s claim that
we can prescind from the probabilities turns out to be false.
First, we need to recognize that even if it is successful,
the Chinese room argument does not obviously entail that
uploading equals death. Agar interprets the Chinese room
argument as an argument about consciousness. In fact,
Searle seems to be arguing for two different, though rela-
ted, claims: the first of which was more prominent in
earlier formulations of the argument and the second of
which subsequently came to the fore. The first is about
understanding: Searle’s claim is that you cannot get
semantics from syntax (Cole 2009). The second is about
consciousness. It is this second issue which is Agar’s focus,
but both must be considered.
On one view, then, there is a non-zero probability of an
upload failing to be conscious; on another, there is a non-
zero probability of an upload failing to understand its own
informational states. On neither of these views, however, is
there precisely the same probability that upload-
ing = death. That depends upon what account of personal
identity and of its cessation is correct. On many views—a
suitably modified organism view, the closest continuer
view, and others—either scenario is compatible with the
continuation of the uploaded person’s existence. For
uploading to entail death, a psychological account of per-
sonal identity must be correct; moreover, it will need to be
a psychological account of just the right kind. My zombie
continuer would be me, at least on some psychological
accounts of personal identity. Still, I suppose that there is a
non-zero probability that Searle’s claim is correct and that
the right account of personal identity is correct. Further,
there seems to be a non-zero probability that even if the
loss of consciousness is consistent with survival, its loss
would sufficiently impoverish life as to make it as bad as
death (see Siewert (1998) for relevant discussion). Though
the issues are trickier than Agar recognizes, I think we
ought to concede that these complications do not by
themselves render the analogy between Searle’s Wager and
Pascal’s invalid.
Other complications can be dealt with in similar ways.
Agar is apparently committed to a particular account of the
badness of death. Some philosophers have rejected the
claim that death is a harm at all. For Agar’s claim that
uploading risks a terrible fate to be correct, it is not suffi-
cient that they be wrong. In addition, the right account of
the badness of death must be a forgone good account, such
as that defended by Kamm (1998). Only if the right
account of death is a foregone good account, can Agar’s
claim that death would be terribly bad for those facing the
choice of uploading be true. Since he holds that death is so
bad for the highly enhanced because of the quality of the
life they forego, he commits himself to this claim. Again,
though, while this greatly complicates the issues, it does
not entail that the analogy between Searle’s wager and
Pascal’s wager is invalid. Though many things must come
down Agar’s way for uploading to entail death—it must
cause the cessation of consciousness or of understanding;
this cessation must entail the death of the person, and the
right account of death must be a foregone goods account—
it is plausible that there is a non-zero probability that all of
this can go his way. If, however, Agar turns out to be
wrong in claiming that we can avoid the assessment of
probabilities, the fact that so many controversial issues
need to be resolved in just the right way will be bad news
for him, raising the probability that uploading is rational.
Agar’s argument that uploading is irrational depends on
the claim that we can never be sure that upload-
ing = death. He notes that given that uploads will be very
good information processors, they will pass any Turning-
type test, but argues that this will not be sufficient to reduce
the probability that uploading = death to zero. No matter
how plausible the claims of an uploaded person that it is
conscious, no matter how much it insists on being subject
to qualia, there is some probability that it is an entirely
unconscious information processor. The problem for Agar
here is that sceptical doubts like this one come cheap. They
are easy to generate and hard to dispel—so hard that it is
plausible to think that there is a non-zero (though perhaps
small) probability of many of these doubts being true.
Consider Agar’s own preferred alternative to uploading.
Because the mind is modular, he claims, we should
enhance ourselves using (inter alia) neuroprostheses that
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replace modular functions while leaving central processes
unaffected. Since modules operate unconsciously, utilizing
these prostheses will not threaten us with death, he sug-
gests. But there is a non-zero probability that Agar is
wrong. After all, the modularity thesis is controversial;
moreover, even if it is true, it might be that Fodorian
modules (somehow) support consciousness. Indeed, given
that (a) it is controversial whether modules are neurologi-
cally localized—they might be spread out across the
brain—and given also that (b) brain regions play multiple
roles, it seems reasonably likely that in replacing or sup-
plementing brain-based modules with neuroprostheses, we
risk losing the basis of consciousness. Mutatis mutandis,
the same seems to be true of understanding. Hence, it
seems that it is not just uploading that falls within the scope
of Searle’s wager: we should not be enhancing ourselves
by this method either.
It follows immediately from these considerations that
Agar will have a harder time than he realizes in establishing
that risking death through radical enhancement is so terri-
ble. Its badness, recall, rests on the quality of the life
foregone by the person, but if we dare not enhance ourselves
with neuroprostheses, then the quality of life that is risked is
somewhat lower. If neuroprostheses of the kind Agar
regards as acceptable are too risky, then the choice facing
future agents will more closely resemble the choice we
would face, were uploading available now, and as Agar
concedes, choosing uploading in those circumstances may
not be irrational. But worse is to come: it is possible to
generate sceptical doubts for all the enhancements on
Agar’s list. Take genetic enhancements. Given the uncer-
tainties which characterize the current state of our knowl-
edge concerning consciousness, we cannot assign a
probability of zero to the proposition that genetic
enhancement will cause the cessation of consciousness (or
of some other property that is necessary for personal iden-
tity or that makes life worth living). Indeed, Agar’s own
speculation regarding how uploading ourselves might cause
the cessation of consciousness seems to apply straightfor-
wardly to genetic enhancements. Agar argues, as we have
seen, that non-modular central processes are the seat of
consciousness. He points out that these central processes are
commonly taken to be much slower than modular processes.
Might not it be, he asks, that consciousness actually depends
on this slowness of processing? In that case, a gain in speed
might imperil consciousness. Perhaps, who really knows
beyond all doubt? In that case, however, genetic enhance-
ments imperil consciousness. Who knows how close we are
to the speed limit right now: perhaps, a small increment in
speed will spell perpetual darkness.
So, no genetic enhancements for us. Searle’s wager
applies more widely that Agar want it to. Agar is no bio-
conservative, yet the conclusion we seem to be heading for
is a bioconservative one: no enhancements, lest we lose
everything. Actually, though, the scope of Searle’s wager is
broader than even the bioconservative could want: it rules
out non-technological enhancements as much as techno-
logical. Perhaps increases in IQ are incompatible with the
continuation of consciousness. Given the continuation of
the Flynn effect—the gradual rise in IQs across time—
perhaps we are in danger right now. The explanation for the
Flynn effect is still controversial. One theory is that the rise
is due to better nutrition (Mingroni 2004). We had better cut
back on our fruit and vegetables, just to be on the safe side.
Another explanation of the Flynn effect is that it is due to
better and longer education (Neisser 1997). Flynn himself
thinks the cause is modernatization, with the increasing
complexity of daily life it brings (Dickens and Flynn 2002).
Again, we had better take steps to simplify and stupefy life.
It might be objected that we need not take these dra-
matic steps. The Flynn effect is about rising average IQs,
and you, you might think, have had a good education, good
nutrition and a complex environment, thereby benefiting
from the cognitive advantages these things bring, and have
nevertheless preserved your consciousness. We can there-
fore extend these benefits more widely without fear. All we
need do is to ensure that we do not raise anyone above the
level that you enjoy. There are several problems with this
suggestion. First, you cannot be sure—you cannot assign a
probability of zero to the hypothesis—that idiosyncratic
factors in your environment preserved your consciousness
or that bringing everyone up a little further will not (say)
make the environment too complex for the preservation of
consciousness. For all you know, widespread zombification
is already occurring. Perhaps, you are the only conscious
person for miles around. Second, and more radically, are
you sure you are conscious?
Consider the following argument:
1. It is possible, in some sense of ‘possible’, that we might
each have a zombie twin: a functional duplicate of
ourselves (which might or might not also be a physical
duplicate) that lacks phenomenal consciousness.
2. Your zombie twin would believe (falsely) that it is
conscious.
3. Since, by hypothesis, your zombie twin has the same
beliefs as you, your belief that you are conscious
cannot be caused by your being conscious (for if it
were, your zombie twin would not be a functional
duplicate of you).
4. It follows that you would believe you were conscious
whether you were conscious or not.
Conclusion (1) your belief that you are conscious is not
justified. Hence;
Conclusion (2) you do not know that you are conscious.
368 AI & Soc (2011) 26:363–369
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Now, this argument may be wrong. There are numerous
ways of replying to it. You might deny that zombies are
possible. Or, like Chalmers (2003), you might deny that our
zombie twins have the same phenomenal beliefs as our-
selves. Be that as it may, surely there is some non-zero
chance that the argument (or some suitably modified ver-
sion of it) is correct or perhaps that though our zombie
twins would lack our phenomenal beliefs, this difference—
since it cannot be introspected by zombies—cannot be
appealed to in order to establish even for each of us that we
are conscious (for were we zombies, it would seem to us, in
some sense of ‘seem’, that we were appealing to it to rule
out our being zombies). Perhaps it is already too late, or
perhaps it is not too late yet, but stimulate your brain any
further—say, by reading just one more word … Oops.
Of course, it ought to be pointed out that Agar thinks we
are not now in the position of the person in Searle’s wager,
because by becoming zombies we would lose much less
than would the radically enhanced. But he might be wrong!
Perhaps becoming a zombie is losing everything (though
the value of consciousness is hard to pin down, there is
some intuitive appeal to the idea that it is of supreme value
or that it enables everything that is of value, such that in
losing it we lose everything).
6 Conclusions
I conclude that Searle’s wager fails. We cannot argue from
the fact that there is a non-zero chance that radically
enhancing ourselves would entail death to the conclusion
that we ought not to enhance ourselves. That argument
extends too broadly. Like the precautionary principle,
whose problems it mirrors, it entails that we ought never to
do anything to ourselves. But like the precautionary prin-
ciple, it also seems to entail that we risk too much in not
taking action either. It therefore fails to guide action at all.
There is no argument against radical enhancement that
prescinds from the probabilities. Deciding whether we
ought to upload ourselves therefore requires that we assess
the risks and benefits of doing so. I have suggested that the
likelihood of uploading entailing death—or some other
equally bad fate—is likely to be relatively low, because so
many controversial issues have to be settled in the right
way for the conclusion to follow. It may nevertheless be
the case that we ought neither to upload ourselves nor to
invest in technologies which might make uploading a
future possibility. I remain agnostic on that question here.
I want only to insist that this is a question that requires
ordinary cost-benefit analysis to answer.
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